This essay was written for one of the modules I studied for my MA. I was intending to try and get it published at some point. In the meantime it serves well as a blog post.
A Critical Consideration of the Role that Philosophical Presuppositions Play in the Interpretation of Luther’s De servo arbitrio.
The debate between Luther and Erasmus on the bondage of the will is considered one of the greatest intellectual debates in European history. Luther’s response to Erasmus in De servo arbitrio[1] (DSA) remains central in contemporary Luther interpretation. It is the purpose of this essay to outline some difficulties that face interpreters of DSA and the role of the interpreter’s philosophical presuppositions in that interpretive process. There are real benefits that can be had in the application of modern philosophical categories to the Luther-Erasmus debate. Perhaps the most notable of these benefits is a more precise and fruitful ecumenical discussion. Yet, as with all historical interpretation, in applying contemporary philosophical categories we run the risk of anachronism and greater confusion about the debate than when we started. Taking McSorley’s Luther: Right or Wrong? as a case study I mean to demonstrate some of the pitfalls that often plague interpretation of DSA and then put forward a constructive account of the work using contemporary philosophical categories tempered by Luther’s own considerations[2]. Finally, I will conclude by suggesting some basic interpretive principles for future Luther interpretation.
Here it is worth providing a working definition of determinism as this will prove useful later. “Any event is determined, according to this core notion, just in case there are conditions (e.g., the decrees of fate, the foreordaining acts of God, antecedent physical causes plus laws of nature) whose joint occurrence is (logically) sufficient for the occurrence of the event: It must be the case that if these determining conditions jointly obtain, the determined event occurs.”[3]
An Overview of the Literature:
Interpretation of Luther’s DSA is remarkably diverse. We might broadly distinguish the literature in terms of focus. Firstly, there are those who focus more on the pastoral/kerygmatic aspect of Luther’s thought[4]. Secondly, there are those whose emphasis is on the philosophical coherence of the ideas put forward[5]. From the middle of the twentieth century towards its end the literature seems to have been dominated by those concerned primarily with the latter. In recent years however, there has been a resurgence of more charitable philosophical analyses as well as a greater emphasis on the role of Luther’s pastoral and biblical experience. Additionally, each interpreter has their own distinctive motivation, be it ecumenical, historical, or theological, etc.[6] The key to Luther’s thought for interpreters is the dialectic between pastoral and philosophical. Unless we understand this aspect of Luther’s thought we are liable to dumb him down, make him more palatable to our modern sensibilities and misrepresent him. The benefits of the recent move towards understanding Luther within a pastoral context means that interpreters are better equipped to grasp how that effects his approach to philosophical questions and theological priorities.
The Nature of the Debate:
One might be forgiven for thinking that the definition of free will is obvious given its ubiquitous role in popular theodicy. In reality this simply isn’t so. The word ‘freedom’ means all kinds of different things depending on the context and should one decide to investigate the will and its ‘freedom’ there are a raft of complex distinctions and terms to familiarize oneself with[7]. The problem is compounded in the Luther-Erasmus debate for at least three reasons.
The first reason for the complexity of the debate regards the nature of DSA as a polemic response to Erasmus’ work, De libero arbitrio. In DSA Luther takes Erasmus to task, gradually working his way through Erasmus’ argument according to the conventions of Scholastic disputation. In working this way Luther commits himself to responding to the framework laid down by Erasmus. Malysz writes, “It is particularly important to keep in mind that it is chiefly a polemical refutation of Erasmus and only secondarily a presentation of Luther’s own view.”[8] Given this fact, interpretation of Luther’s argument is complicated since he is not primarily interested in putting forward a clear expression or theoretical articulation of his own view on the matter[9].
Secondly, it is clear throughout the debate that Luther and Erasmus have radically different theological aims, methodologies and concerns. Luther is primarily concerned to locate the entire discussion of free choice within his theology of the cross. God’s promises to us in Christ can only be secured given the bondage of the will. This, Luther says, is “the question on which everything hinges…”[10] The entirety of Luther’s discussion presupposes the total passivity of the human will in justification, “…otherwise, we should make Christ either superfluous or the redeemer of only the lowest part of man, which would be blasphemy and sacrilege.”[11] Erasmus, in accordance with the concern for moral reform characteristic of renaissance humanism, is primarily concerned with the philosophical relation between free choice and moral responsibility[12]. Erasmus is adamant that Luther’s view of the will is incoherent and morally damaging. In addition, if the will is bound and God works all in all, “Who will be able to bring himself to love God with all his heart when He created hell seething with eternal torments in order to punish his own misdeeds in his victims as though he took delight in human torments?”[13] The two thinkers evidently have different concerns and theological priorities. Again, this complicates things for the interpreter as Erasmus and Luther tend to talk past each other.
Thirdly, Luther demonstrates a reluctance to use the term ‘free will’ or ‘free choice’, often noting how the term is so apt for misinterpretation. “…I would wish that the words, “free will,” had never been invented. They are not found in Scripture and would better be called “self will”…”[14] Again, Luther writes, “For the expression “free choice” is too imposing, too wide and full, and the people think that it signifies – as the force and nature of the term requires – a power that can turn itself freely in either direction, without being under anyone’s influence or control.”[15] Luther is grasping for a reformation in the terminology characteristic of Scholastic disputation on the will that better fits his theologia crucis[16]. He demonstrates similar reticence concerning ‘necessity’, “I could wish indeed that another and a better word had been introduced into our discussion than this usual one, “necessity,” which is not rightly applied either to the divine or the human will. It has too harsh and incongruous a meaning for this purpose, for it suggests a kind of compulsion, and the very opposite of willingness, although the subject under discussion implies no such thing.”[17] In all of this, Luther is searching for an adequate terminology with which to relocate the discussion on the will within a Christ shaped theology, leaving no room for human beings in their own justification.
So the interpreter has numerous difficulties to contend with; an already complex contemporary philosophical and theological debate, arguments couched in Scholastic rhetoric and polemic, authors with widely differing theological concerns, and Luther’s search for adequate terminology to articulate his position. Kolb sums up the two main traps that result. First, misinterpretation of DSA can be the result of an insufficient understanding of Scholastic rhetoric and logic, and lack of attention to Luther’s Christological and pastoral focus. A second type of misinterpretation is the result of applying philosophical categories to DSA that are totally alien to Luther’s thought. Kolb writes, “…the scholarly lack of clarity over De servo arbitrio indicates how even great minds find themselves trapped within their own presuppositions – what “cannot be” in their own thought world could not have existed in the context of another, particularly if they admire and make use of a historical figure in ways that contradict that person’s own positions.”[18] The application of contemporary philosophy in order to bring clarity to a muddled debate is commendable; however, in so doing we have to acknowledge that we run the risk of reading Luther in a way that doesn’t do justice to his primary aims or his philosophical view of moral responsibility. Zahl has pointed out an emphasis on Luther’s philosophical categories often bloats the significance of his philosophical argument to the point of missing the fundamental exegetical and experiential focus of Luther’s work[19]. Luther is primarily driven by his firm belief in the passivity of human beings in justification. That is not to say that the application of modern philosophical categories or presuppositions cannot bring clarity to the Luther-Erasmus debate. Rather, the philosophical categories that we use to understand Luther’s theology in DSA need to be moulded by Luther’s own concerns and terminology. A good way to demonstrate the need for this is with reference to a prominent work of Luther scholarship from the 20th century, Harry J. McSorley’s Luther: Right or Wrong?
A Case Study: McSorley’s Luther: Right or Wrong?
McSorley offers a monumental study of the development of theology and philosophy of free will, tracking its development from the biblical source material through Augustine and Scholasticism in order to bring about a greater appreciation of the philosophical, theological and historical context of DSA. In the opening chapter he suggests that a triple distinction between different types of freedom will bring clarity to the debate. These types of freedom he calls ‘natural’, ‘circumstantial’ and ‘acquired’[20]. McSorley frames his project within these terminological parameters. As a result of his study McSorley concludes that Luther’s necessitarian argument and consequent view of the will in DSA cannot be reconciled with the Catholic tradition[21]. Essential to McSorley’s conclusion is his belief that determinism and human responsibility for sin are incompatible and that one can only retain a belief in moral responsibility given ‘natural’ freedom of the will. Further, a belief in moral responsibility is necessary if someone is to remain within the Catholic tradition. Since Luther’s necessitarian argument leads to a denial of natural freedom of the will, Luther cannot be considered a member of the Catholic tradition.
In contrast, it is my view that McSorley’s conclusion regarding Luther’s theology of the will is the result of tacit and contentious philosophical presuppositions. Of primary concern is McSorley’s belief that ‘natural free will’ and determinism are incompatible. He thinks this for two interrelated reasons; one consciously put forward, the other tacitly assumed. The first is McSorley’s contention that determinism undermines moral responsibility. This argument is essentially Erasmian. If God works all in all, as Luther seems to suggest, what is to prevent us from concluding that God is the author of sin? McSorley writes, “Because of his failure to discuss the origin of sin and through his emphasis on the all-embracing activity of God, Luther seems to make God the actual originator of sin.”[22] The second (tacit) argument is rooted within his definition of natural freedom which he defines as, “…the ability to will or not will something, who can’t decide for or against a course of action, or to choose between alternatives.”[23] We will discuss these in turn.
In response to the first contention, it is clear that Luther does want to affirm human responsibility for sin alongside his necessitarian argument. God justly punishes the ungodly because they deserve it[24]. “God works evil in us, i.e., by means of us, not through any fault of his, but owing to our faultiness, since we are by nature evil and he is good…”[25] Luther believes that although God works evil in us, it is not God who is morally responsible for that evil, but human beings. McSorley’s chief way of undermining the view that Luther believes in human responsibility for sin, is to highlight passages where Luther affirms God’s working evil in human beings and his judgement even of those who ‘don’t deserve it’. McSorley writes, “What Luther never questions is that God is just even when he condemns the undeserving (“immeritos damnat”).”[26] But that is not precisely what Luther says. In his discussion of whether God damns those who don’t deserve it, he makes it clear that God does indeed damn those who don’t deserve it by human standards, but not by God’s own perfect standards of justice. The Erasmian protests, “He [God] must be brought to order, and laws must be prescribed for him, so that he may damn none but those who in our judgement have deserved it”[27]. Luther writes, “In the former case he pours out grace and mercy on the unworthy, in the latter he pours out wrath and severity on the undeserving, and in both cases he is unprincipled and unjust by human standards, but just and true by his own.”[28] The entire discussion of whether God damns the undeserving takes place within the context of Luther’s argument against the application of human standards to the divine. Luther argues that human comprehension of the divine is severely limited and so we should expect God’s justice to be incomprehensible; however, Luther is not denying human moral responsibility for sin. What he is denying is our ability to properly conceive how this can be the case.
Additionally, while acknowledging the limits of human comprehension, Luther does provide reasons for thinking that human beings remain morally responsible for sin. Human beings are not coerced, rather they do what they do willingly. Luther writes, “For neither the divine nor the human will does what it does, whether good or evil, under any compulsion, but from sheer pleasure or desire, as with true freedom; and yet the will of God is immutable and infallible, and it governs our mutable will…”[29] Forde nicely articulates the idea, “The reader must always bear in mind that the will is not a thing, not a faculty or some such, but something like loving and being loved, a state of being grasped, a possibility of being captivated.”[30] The implication is, given that human beings aren’t coerced, they are morally responsible for sin.
McSorley finds this difficult to believe, “…to say simply that man has responsibility for his sin because he wills his sin and yet to deny that this is a free willing of the sin, to deny that man could have avoided sinning is to give “responsibility” a new definition. Responsibility without freedom is as incomprehensible to civil justice as it is to the pre-Lutheran theological tradition.”[31] McSorley denies that Luther can account for moral responsibility because he disagrees with the soundness of Luther’s philosophical theory of the will and his attempt to make sense of moral responsibility. But it must be pointed out, that whether McSorley’s criticism is correct or not, it doesn’t follow that Luther thought his conclusion unsound, or his argument invalid or non-Catholic. Whether Luther’s argument is sound or not is beside the point, the real question, for McSorley at least, should be whether he maintains Catholic conclusions. To this we can reply in the affirmative. Luther argues that we are morally responsible for our sin and that we’re not responsible for our justification, in accord with the mainstream Catholic tradition[32].
But perhaps what McSorley finds objectionable is not Luther’s conclusions, but the nature of his argument. This idea of responsibility without natural freedom is incomprehensible to “the pre-Lutheran theological tradition.”[33] Luther’s argument legitimizes the claim that he is unorthodox; it seems entirely novel. Yet the novelty of Luther’s argument is only apparent and not substantial. Kraal has shown that there is good reason to believe that Luther’s argument finds a precedent in Catholic tradition in the work of Lorenzo Valla[34]. Furthermore, he provides a detailed discussion of the parallels between Augustine and Luther on the subject of moral responsibility that leads him to conclude that, “…once it is realized that Luther’s denial of ‘free will’ is mere shorthand for the affirmation, made also by the Augustinian, that ‘all we do . . . is in reality done necessarily and immutably in respect to God’s will’, the positions of Luther and the Augustinian can be seen to amount to the same thing.”[35] Luther’s argument is therefore Catholic in its conclusions and finds a precedent in the tradition.
How is it that McSorley misses this? The answer can be found with regard to his second, and this time tacit, philosophical presupposition already at work within his argument. It was noted that McSorley defines ‘natural freedom’ as the ability “…to will or not will something, who can’t decide for or against a course of action, or to choose between alternatives.”[36] On inspection this definition of natural freedom is a controversial one. In discussing free will and determinism Craig and Moreland distinguish between three standard types of freedom roughly corresponding to McSorley’s own categories: freedom of moral and rational responsibility (natural), freedom of permission (circumstantial), and freedom of personal integrity (acquired)[37]. Unlike McSorley, Craig and Moreland note two different philosophical strategies for securing freedom of moral responsibility. There are libertarian and compatibilist strategies. The compatibilist understands freedom of moral responsibility to be ‘compatible’ with determinism[38]. Interestingly, Craig and Moreland’s definition of libertarian free will bears striking resemblance to McSorley’s definition of natural freedom. “Real freedom requires a type of control over one’s action – and, more importantly, over one’s will – such that, given a choice to do A (raise one’s hand to vote) or B (leave the room), nothing determines that either choice is made.”[39] Both the libertarian and McSorley define natural freedom as an undetermined choice between alternatives. The identification is made clear when McSorley writes, “…to deny that man could have avoided sinning is to give “responsibility a new definition.”[40] For McSorley, freedom of moral responsibility is only possible given an undetermined choice, i.e. libertarianism. But since Luther understands moral responsibility to be possible in a non-libertarian sense, Luther’s orthodoxy is ruled out from the beginning by McSorley’s choice to define natural freedom in a way that denies determinist construals of freedom of moral responsibility. It doesn’t help that this false dichotomy between determinism and free will is perpetuated throughout Luther scholarship. Even Luther’s most staunch defenders often fall into the trap of polarizing freedom and determinism alongside a conflation of determinism and coercion. Forde writes, “For now it is enough to note that it shows clearly that the bondage of the will in question is not, for Luther, a matter of force or determinism.”[41] Coercion and determinism are identical according to Forde. In contrast, Luther is adamant that although coercion is clearly one type of necessity or determination, it is not the only type. Ironically, the terminological dichotomy is perpetuated by Luther himself who, because of his reluctance to use the term ‘free will’, contrasts it with his specific type of determinism, ‘necessity of immutability’[42].
In McSorley’s argument then, we can see a number of philosophical presuppositions at work. McSorley believes moral responsibility can only be secured given a libertarian definition of free will, and that natural freedom must be defined in a libertarian sense because that’s the only way of securing moral responsibility and standing within Catholic tradition. As a result, his conclusion about what is, or is not Catholic is predetermined by his own view of free will and moral responsibility to the detriment of historical considerations.
An Alternative Thesis: Luther the Compatibilist
McSorley must be commended for his insightful distinction between different types of freedom and his application of those categories to the Luther-Erasmus debate, but it is clear that his categories have not been tempered sufficiently by Luther’s own considerations. I think it is possible to make a slight modification to McSorley’s categories in light of Luther’s argument that will bring greater clarity to the debate, as well as providing a more robust foundation for contemporary ecumenical dialogue on the freedom of the will.
Let’s begin by outlining Luther’s two main concerns. Firstly, Luther wanted to maintain human moral responsibility for sin (natural freedom). This has been sufficiently demonstrated above. Secondly, Luther was adamant that human beings had no responsibility for their own justification, i.e. that it was impossible for them to merit their own salvation by doing what they ought (acquired freedom). The second assumption is supported by his exegesis, experience and necessitarian argument. He writes, “…salvation is beyond our own powers and devices, and depends on the work of God alone…”[43] It is Luther’s emphasis on the efficacy of the cross and the total passivity of human beings in justification that takes priority throughout the work, not theoretical explanations as to how human beings can be said to be morally responsible for their sin, or why God damns some and not others. These two considerations exist in tension but Luther’s uncompromising soteriological concerns take priority. Kolb summarizes, “Recognizing the mysterious coexistence of both God’s responsibility and human responsibility is necessary for understanding Luther’s teaching on what it means to be human.”[44]
It is therefore essential that when we apply philosophical categories to DSA that they be moulded by this dialectic. It is my argument that Luther’s view of freedom of moral responsibility can be adequately defined as a form of compatibilism and that this can be distinguished from acquired freedom. These two are not unconnected in Luther’s thought, and he often blurs the distinction, but it is helpful to make it nonetheless. As was noted above, much of the confusion in the Luther-Erasmus debate is prompted by their different concerns and understandings of the will and its role in their respective theological systems. For the most part, Erasmus wants to talk about freedom of moral responsibility whereas Luther wants to talk about acquired freedom. The distinction between these will help us to parse the debate properly in its different dimensions. It would be wise to justify the use of the ‘compatibilist’ label. By compatibilism we do not mean to identify Luther with contemporary philosophical approaches to the subject. The word compatibilism is simply intended to denote that Luther affirms freedom of moral responsibility as well as determinism. It is my contention that if we take Luther to affirm that both God and humans have freedom of moral responsibility, but that humans are bound with respect to their acquired freedom, the debate will be clarified significantly.
Luther affirms human moral responsibility for sin, but to call Luther a compatibilist we also have to show that he is a determinist. This will require defining ‘necessity of immutability’ by comparing it to his views of other kinds of necessity. Luther suggests this himself, “The reader’s intelligence must therefore supply what the word “necessity” does not express, by understanding it to mean what you might call the immutability of the will of God and the impotence of our evil will, or what some have called the necessity of immutability, though this is not very good either grammatically or theologically.”[45] That Luther distinguishes between necessity of coercion and necessity of immutability alone suggests that he doesn’t think all types of determination or necessity rule out moral responsibility. In addition to this, Luther contrasts his view of necessity with the traditional Scholastic distinction between the necessity of consequence and the necessity of the consequent. In order to articulate what Luther means to say by necessity of immutability we will need to understand this contrast.
Luther discusses the Scholastic distinction, as well as its motivating principle, at least three times in DSA[46]. It is this distinction that Erasmus uses to justify his belief that Judas could have changed his intention and that human choices are contingent[47]. Luther understands the word contingent to mean, “…in such a way that it could have been otherwise.”[48] In other words, Luther takes contingency to imply the possibility of undetermined choices. Unlike Erasmus, Luther thinks the Scholastic distinction incapable of supporting the conclusion that humans have genuine choice between alternatives. It’s not that he denies the distinction between necessity of consequence and the necessity of the consequent. Rather, he denies that it can bear the weight that Erasmus and the Scholastics seek to place upon it. Luther says, “…this is no different from saying that the thing done is not God himself.”[49] The distinction is trivial. Erasmus might reply, “Doesn’t the distinction allow for undetermined free choice?” On the contrary, he argues, if Erasmus were to properly understand what the necessity of consequence entails; that would be enough to undermine Erasmus’ entire position. “If you grant necessity of consequence, free choice is vanquished and laid low, and there is no help for it in either the necessity or the contingency of the consequent.”[50] The necessity of consequence doesn’t support Erasmus’ argument at all, it supports Luther’s. A statement of the necessity of consequence such as, ‘If p then q’, shows that q necessarily follows from p, but there is no room for ‘changing one’s mind’ or an undetermined choice between q and an alternative –q; q necessarily happens given p[51]. By ‘necessary’ he means, “…in such a way that it could not be otherwise.”[52] Luther writes, “For this is the result of the necessity of consequence, i.e., if God foreknows a thing, that thing necessarily happens. That is to say, there is no such thing as free choice.”[53] And so he asks, “But what do they achieve by this playing with words? This, of course, that the thing done is not necessary, in the sense that it has not a necessary existence…Nevertheless, it remains a fact that everything that comes into being does so necessarily.”[54] Therefore, the distinction cannot be marshalled in support of Erasmus’ cause. Luther believes everything happens necessarily. Contingency has no effective role to play. What Luther means then, by necessity of immutability, is that we are not coerced into doing what we do despite being determined and despite everything happening by necessity.
In further support of this compatibilist understanding of the necessity of immutability we might also reference Luther’s own definition. “This is what we call the necessity of immutability: It means that the will cannot change itself and turn in a different direction, but is rather the more provoked into willing by being resisted, as its resentment shows.”[55] Luther implies that the necessity of immutability means we cannot change what we do, we cannot turn in a different direction and it is not possible to choose neutrally but that this is so in accordance with, and not in contrast to, our will. Even when God commands the good, that does not imply the possibility of avoiding sin. Rather, experience shows such commands prompt us to will evil more vehemently. We are always necessitated by desire, we are always determined by what captivates us. Our will is not simply bound in terms of our inability to choose the good, we are also bound by our inability to make undetermined decisions between alternatives and those decisions that we make happen in accordance with our wills. Given God’s immutable will and foreknowledge, and his will to bring about condition t we would always willingly do p, there is no possible world where given t we could bring about –p.
A common criticism of the view that Luther is a determinist is based “…on the texts where Luther recognizes liberum arbitrium in inferioribus…”[56] (regarding the things below us). Luther writes,
“But if we are unwilling to let this term [free choice] go altogether – though that would be the safest and most God-fearing thing to do – let us at least teach men to use it honestly, so that free choice is allowed to man only with respect to what is beneath him and not what is above him. That is to say, a man should know that with regard to his faculties and possessions he has the right to use, to do, or to leave undone, according to his own free choice, though even this is controlled by the free choice of God alone… On the other hand in relation to God, or in matters pertaining to salvation or damnation, a man has no free choice but is captive, subject and slave either of the will of God or the will of Satan.”[57]
Using this text as evidence of indeterminism isn’t particularly compelling. If we apply our distinction between natural and acquired freedom the text reads perfectly well according to the compatibilist view. Human beings are responsible with regard to things below them but not with regard to things above them, because they have freedom of moral responsibility they are responsible agents, but since their acquired freedom is bound they cannot be responsible for their justification. Luther has simply reiterated the parameters of his discussion of the will: We are morally responsible for our sin, but God is responsible for our salvation. Furthermore, even here Luther is clear that choices pertaining to the things below us are “…controlled by the free choice of God alone.”
Conclusion:
It is clear that when attempting to clarify a debate as confusing as the one between Luther and Erasmus a careful use of philosophical categories can be really helpful. For interpreters, that means having our philosophical categories moulded sufficiently by the historical sources rather than the imposition of our own concerns and definitions. One constant danger in Luther scholarship is the tendency to play down Luther’s radicalism and to make him palatable to our contemporary mind-set without proper attention to context. It has been demonstrated in this paper that when we have our interpretive philosophical categories tempered by Luther’s own concerns we understand his theology better in all its radicalism and are better equipped to explain his theologia crucis to people of a different theological context. His theologia crucis and his consequent belief in the inability of human beings to justify themselves totally transformed all that he did and said, including his theology of the will.
Word Count: 5499
Bibliography:
Adler, Mortimer, J. The Idea of Freedom Volume II. Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc, 1961.
Craig, William Lane., and Moreland, J. P. Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2003.
Forde, Gerhard O. The Captivation of the Will, edited by Steven Paulson. Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2005.
Graybill, Gregory. Evangelical Free Will: Philipp Melanchthon’s Doctrinal Journey on the Origins of Faith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Hütter, Reinhard. “(Re‐)Forming Freedom: Reflections “after Veritatis splendor” on Freedom’s Fate in Modernity and Protestantism’s Antinomian Captivity,” Modern Theology 17:2 (2001): 117-161.
Jenson, Robert W. “An Ontology of Freedom in the De servo arbitrio of Luther” Modern Theology 10:3 (July 1994): 247-252.
Kane, Robert. “Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free-Will Debates (Part 2).” In The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert Kane, 3-35. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Knut, Alfsvåg. “Luther on Necessity” Harvard Theological Review 108:1 (January 2015): 52-69.
Kolb, Robert. Bound Choice, Election, and Wittenberg Theological Method. Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2005.
Kraal, Anders. “Free Choice, Determinism, and the Re-Evaluation of Luther in Twentieth-Century Swedish Theology” Studia Theologica – Nordic Journal of Theology 67:1 (June 2013): 28-42.
Kraal, Anders. “Valla-Style Determinism and the Intellectual Background of Luther’s de servo arbitrio,” Harvard Theological Review 108:3 (2015): 402-422.
Kraal, Anders. “Luther’s necessitarian argument in De servo arbitrio,” Religious Studies 52:1 (2016): 81-95.
Luther, Martin. “Defense and Explanation of All the Articles, 1521.” Translated by Charles M. Jacobs. In Luther’s Works: Volume 32, edited by George W. Forell, 3-101. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 2016.
Malysz, Piotr J. “Martin Luther’s Trinitarian Hermeneutic of Freedom,” in Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of Religion (2017): 1-26. Accessed August 16, 2017, http://religion.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.001.0001/acrefore-9780199340378-e-355?print=pdf
McSorley, Harry, J. Luther: Right or Wrong?. London: Newman Press, 1969.
Nestingen, James A. “Introduction” In The Captivation of the Will, edited by Steven Paulson, 1-22. Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2005.
Ozment, Steven E. The Age of Reform. 1250-1550: an Intellectual and Religious History of Late Medieval and Reformation Europe. London: Yale University Press, 1980.
Rupp, E. Gordon., and Watson, Philip S, eds. Library of Christian Classics Volume XVII: Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and Salvation. Translated by E. Gordon Rupp and Philip S. Watson London: SCM Press Ltd, 1969.
Urban, Linwood. “Was Luther a Thoroughgoing Determinist?” Journal of Theological Studies 22:1 (April 1971): 113-139.
Zahl, Simeon. “Non-Competitive Agency and Luther’s Experiential Argument Against Virtue”, unpublished article.
[1] E. Gordon Rupp, Philip S Watson, eds., Library of Christian Classics Volume XVII: Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and Salvation, trans. E. Gordon Rupp and Philip S. Watson. (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1969).
[2] Harry J. McSorley, Luther: Right or Wrong? (London: Newman Press, 1969).
[3] Robert Kane, “Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free-Will Debates (Part 2),” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, ed. Robert Kane (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 4.
[4] Cf. Gerhard O. Forde, The Captivation of the Will, ed. Steven Paulson (Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, 2005); Robert Kolb, Bound Choice, Election, and Wittenberg Theological Method (Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, 2005), 9; Steven E. Ozment, The Age of Reform. 1250-1550: an Intellectual and Religious History of Late Medieval and Reformation Europe (London: Yale University Press, 1980), 243.
[5] Linwood Urban, “Was Luther a Thoroughgoing Determinist?” Journal of Theological Studies 22:1, (April 1971): 113-139; McSorley, Luther?, (Cf.256-260 for a summary of this literature); Robert W. Jenson, “An Ontology of Freedom in the De servo arbitrio of Luther” Modern Theology 10:3, (July 1994): 247-252, Cf. Anders Kraal, “Free Choice, Determinism, and the Re-Evaluation of Luther in Twentieth-Century Swedish Theology” Studia Theologica – Nordic Journal of Theology 67:1 (June 2013): 28-42.
[6] Simeon Zahl, “Non-Competitive Agency and Luther’s Experiential Argument Against Virtue”, unpublished article; Alfsvåg Knut, “Luther on Necessity” Harvard Theological Review 108:1 (January 2015): 52-69; Piotr J. Malysz, “Martin Luther’s Trinitarian Hermeneutic of Freedom,” in Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of Religion (2017): 12, accessed August 16, 2017, http://religion.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.001.0001/acrefore-9780199340378-e-355?print=pdf, James A. Nestingen, “Introduction,” in Forde, Captivation, 3.
[7] Cf. Kane, Free-Will Debates, 3-4.
[8] Malysz, “Trinitarian Hermeneutic”, 12.
[9] Rupp and Watson, Luther and Erasmus, 103.
[10] Ibid, 333.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid, 41.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Martin Luther, “Defense and Explanations of All the Articles, 1521,” trans. Charles M. Jacobs, in Luther’s Works: Volume 32, ed. George W. Forell (Philedelphia: Fortress Press, 1958), 94.
[15] Rupp and Watson, Luther and Erasmus, 142.
[16] Malysz, “Trinitarian Hermeneutic”, 12. Cf. McSorley, Luther?, 302.
[17] Rupp and Watson, Luther and Erasmus, 119-120. Cf. Gerhard O. Forde, The Captivation of the Will (Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, 2005), 31. Cf. Kolb, Bound Choice, 9.
[18] Kolb, Bound Choice, 9.
[19] Zahl, “Agency”.
[20] McSorley, Luther?, 25-28. Cf. Mortimer J. Adler, The Idea of Freedom Volume II (Garden City: Doubleday & Company Inc, 1961), 5-7.
[21] McSorley, Luther?, 369.
[22] McSorley, Luther?, 343.
[23] Ibid, 25. Italics mine.
[24] Rupp and Watson, Luther and Erasmus, 260.
[25] Ibid, 234.
[26] McSorley, Luther?, 347.
[27] Rupp and Watson, Luther and Erasmus, 258. Italics mine.
[28] Ibid, 259-260. Italics mine.
[29] Ibid, 120. cf. 139.
[30] Forde, Captivation, 57.
[31] McSorley, Luther?, 343, cf. Kane, Free-Will Debates, 9, 17. Notes that the ‘avoidability’ condition is a key feature of incompatibilism.
[32] McSorley, Luther?, 179.
[33] Ibid, 343.
[34] Anders Kraal, “Valla-Style Determinism and the Intellectual Background of Luther’s de servo arbitrio,” Harvard Theological Review 108:3 (2015), 402-422.
[35] Anders Kraal, “Luther’s necessitarian argument in De servo arbitrio,” Religious Studies 52:1 (2016), 92-93.
[36] McSorley, Luther?, 25.
[37] William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 268.
[38] Cf. Kane, Free-Will Debates, 9.
[39] Craig and Moreland, Philosophical Foundations, 270.
[40] McSorley, Luther?, 343. Italics mine.
[41] Forde, Captivation, 37.
[42] Cf. Gregory B. Graybill, Evangelical Free Will: Philipp Melanchthon’s doctrinal journey on the origins of faith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 75-76.
[43] Rupp and Watson, Luther and Erasmus, 139.
[44] Kolb, Bound Choice, 60.
[45] Rupp and Watson, Luther and Erasmus, 120.
[46] Ibid, 117-122, 239-241, 246-249.
[47] Ibid, 246-247.
[48] Ibid, 119.
[49] Ibid, 120.
[50] Ibid, 248.
[51] Cf. Kane, Free-Will Debates, 11.
[52] Rupp and Watson, Luther and Erasmus, 119.
[53] Ibid, 248.
[54] Ibid, 120.
[55] Ibid, 139.
[56] McSorley, Luther?, 257.
[57] Rupp and Watson, Luther and Erasmus, 143.
Geometric Theology 