Recently I listened to the dialogue between Peter Williams and Bart Ehrman on Premier Christian Radio. The dialogue formed part of a series of discussions between Christians and skeptics on a variety of key theological and philosophical topics. Williams and Ehrman are both Biblical scholars working at prominent Universities but each hold to opposing views on Gospel reliability. Ehrman majors on the unreliable transmission of the biblical text (and has published numerous books on this topic) and Williams has recently published a book arguing for The Reliability of the Gospels. The following blog post represents ‘my two cents’ on the debate.
One thing that seemed clear to me was that Williams took a while to warm up. The first 45 minutes or so Williams seemed to be on the back foot. If not logically, then rhetorically. The problem seemed to be trying to figure out where the battle lines of the debate needed to be drawn. As the debate continued, both Williams’ and Ehrman’s positions became sharper and, by an hour in, Williams capably defended the presence of a high Christology in the synoptic gospels and did a good job of softening the dichotomies that Ehrman thought to be present between the synoptics and the Gospel of John. While the subject of debate didn’t centre on the presence of a high Christology in the synoptics, it did serve to demonstrate that the Gospel of John painted a picture of Jesus that was in fundamental continuity with the other Gospels.
One of the other main issues of the debate was the presence of apparent contradictions in the scriptures themselves. Ehrman sought to clarify the kind of position that Williams was seeking to defend. When Williams made it clear that he held to the inerrancy of the Bible (though Williams isn’t a fan of the term) the debate moved swiftly to a discussion of Gospel difficulties. The discussion regarding problem passages and prima facie contradictions in the text was particularly focussed on the two different records of Judas’ death. The first appears in the Gospel of Matthew 27:1-10 where Judas, racked with guilt, attempts to return the money earned by his betrayal of Jesus and then hangs himself. The second record is found in Acts 1:18. In the second story no hanging is mentioned but Judas is said to fall headlong and that his body “burst open in the middle and all his bowels gushed out.”
Ehrman is a sharp scholar and is well aware that in order to reconcile these stories Christians usually attempt some sort of ad hoc harmonization. The aim of pointing out repeated ad hoc harmonization of problem passages is to show that such a position is untenable on any kind of historical basis. It is assumed that if a contradiction or anomaly can be provided, then the advocate of inerrancy must relinquish his position to remain within his epistemic rights.
Williams attempted the classic harmonization of the two stories by pointing out that the two were not logically contradictory and that the data was too underdetermined to provide a definitive explanation of Judas’ death. As a possible explanation Williams suggested that Judas hung himself, the rope snapped, and the body fell headlong. I’m fairly happy with Williams’ explanation, but notice what has happened here. Williams is no longer defending the mere reliability of the Gospels. Instead, Williams is being pushed to defend the inerrancy of the Gospels historically. The apparent inconsistencies, even if really present, wouldn’t necessarily undermine the general reliability of the Gospel accounts.
Now of course, Williams is keen to defend the inerrancy of Scripture (as am I) but he seemed to have been goaded by Ehrman into defending the position on a purely textual-historical basis. He seemed to grant Ehrman’s assumption that if he could demonstrate that there was a single textual anomaly that existed in scripture, then his view of inerrancy would be demonstrably irrational. This is a natural move to make in the heat of live debate, but it need not be taken.
In response to this kind of argument against the rationality of belief in biblical inerrancy, J. P. Moreland wrote an article drawing on analytic philosophical work in the field of epistemology[1]. In the article, entitled The Rationality of Belief in Inerrancy, Moreland argued that,
“In order to argue that belief in inerrancy is rational, one need not show that such a belief is certain, evident, or (perhaps) beyond reasonable doubt. One can still be well within one’s epistemic rights in believing the truth of inerrancy, without adopting such a strong notion of rationality that makes it incumbent on one to answer all problem passages and remove all doubts, puzzles and objections.”
In other words, there are a number of academically respected epistemic theories that would allow one to be perfectly rational in holding to biblical inerrancy in the face of apparently irresolvable or problematic textual difficulties. For example, most of us judge the rationality of a belief with reference to our broader web of beliefs and not in isolation from them. In isolation from one’s broader web of beliefs, it might be irrational to hold to the doctrine of inerrancy. But when one introduces a broader noetic structure, things are no longer so clear cut. Moreland writes,
“It is a simplistic scenario of the epistemic situation merely to look at a set of problem passages and the various explanations of them in determining whether or not those explanations are rational. The role of inerrancy in one’s entire set of theological beliefs is also relevant to the rationality of the situation. An interpretation of a problem passage that harmonizes it with another text, and thus preserves inerrancy, may not be as rational as an interpretation that admits an error in the text, if one only considers this particular problem in isolation from other epistemically relevant considerations. But if one considers the depth of ingression of inerrancy as well, then the rationality of preserving belief in inerrancy in one’s noetic structure (as opposed to denying it and having to readjust a large part of one’s structure) can justify suspending judgment or believing a harmonization.”
In which case, one might find the traditional argument for inerrancy, as well as inerrancy’s heavy historical pedigree, sufficient to justify the rationality of belief in inerrancy even in the face of problem passages.
Sproul frames the traditional argument for inerrancy as follows,
Premise A: The Bible is a basically reliable and trustworthy document.
Premise B: On the basis of this reliable document we have sufficient evidence to believe confidently that Jesus Christ is the Son of God.
Premise C: Jesus Christ being the Son of God is an infallible authority.
Premise D: Jesus Christ teaches that the Bible is more than generally trustworthy: it is the very Word of God.
Premise E: That the word, in that it comes from God, is utterly trustworthy because God is utterly trustworthy.
Conclusion: On the basis of the infallible authority of Jesus Christ, the Church believes the Bible to be utterly trustworthy, i.e., infallible.[2]
Notice that this argument isn’t circular and that it only requires the general reliability of the Gospels’ account of Jesus in order to get started. In other words, Williams need not be pressured into defending inerrancy on a historical basis but can happily continue to argue for the more modest position of general reliability knowing that such a position is a sufficient foundation on which to build a theological argument for inerrancy. It is alright not to know how certain passages fit together, we may simply be unable to understand. We can therefore say with Augustine,
“If we are perplexed by an apparent contradiction in Scripture…it is not allowable to say, The author of this book is mistaken; but either the manuscript is faulty, or the translation is wrong, or you have not understood” (CFaust. 11.5).”
[1] Moreland, J.P, “The Rationality of Belief in Inerrancy” in Trinity Journal 7.1 (Spring 1986): 75-86.
[2] Sproul, R.C. Scripture Alone: The Evangelical Doctrine, (2005: P & R Publishing), 72-73.
Geometric Theology 