I was first introduced to Molinism by William Lane Craig. I’m convinced that as an account of God’s foreknowledge and human freedom it is philosophically coherent, biblically supported and theologically useful. For those not in the know, Molinism is a system of thought named after Luis de Molina, a Jesuit theologian living in the 16th century. Molina argued that God doesn’t simply know all possibilities and necessary truths, he also knows what free creatures would do in any given circumstances. In other words, God knows what can, would, and will happen. He makes use of his counterfactual knowledge (knowledge of what would happen) in order to bring about his purposes in the world without negating human freedom.
However, reading Puritan theologians like John Owen has caused me to wrestle with whether a Molinist account of divine foreknowledge can adequately explain the way in which God saves human beings. Sure, it explains how human beings can possess libertarian freedom alongside God’s meticulous providence, but can it go any further than that? If we truly are ‘dead in sin’ (Ephesians 2:1-3) and wilfully rebel against God, how can we ever actually put our faith in God without him violating our freedom?
This is where Kenneth Keathley comes in. In Salvation and Sovereignty: A Molinist Approach, Keathley seeks to make use of the Molinist system to breathe a breath of fresh air into the well worn debates between Arminians and Calvinists. These debates have traditionally surrounded the well known acronym ‘TULIP’, which stands for Total depravity, Unconditional election, Limited atonement, Irresistible grace, and the Perseverance of the saints. For most Arminians, and Arminius himself, the total depravity of the human race was a given, but the other elements were less than clear. The Calvinist generally claims that in order to be consistent, if one accepts total depravity, then the other elements all follow (see for example J. I. Packer’s Among God’s Giants, particularly the chapter ‘Saved by His Precious Blood). In contrast, Keathley thinks that Molinism can be used to undermine the Calvinist claim. He argues for T, U, and P while jettisoning limited atonement and irresistible grace (2). Moreover, he makes use of Timothy George’s ROSES acronym in an attempt to move beyond the deadlock between Arminians and Calvinists (see George, Amazing Grace: God’s Initiative – Our Response).
In this way he proceeds by outlining ROSES (Radical Depravity, Overcoming grace, Sovereign election, Eternal life, Singular redemption) and then presenting the biblical case for Molinism before going into each of the letters of the acronym one by one. This is what interested me in Salvation and Sovereignty, someone was finally going offer a constructive and intentionally Molinist account of soteriology. The question for review is as to whether Keathley manages to achieve this.
As an introduction to Molinism and the biblical data in it’s favour, I thought Keathley’s opening chapters were well written. Keathley offers an accessible entryway into the discussion and a comprehensive summary of many of the important theological issues and philosophical terms. For those familiar with Molinism there is nothing new here. Keathley covers ground that has been covered at length by Craig and Flint, and D. A. Carson (in his own way). He draws out the biblical data that indicates both the need for a robust doctrine of divine sovereignty and an equally robust account of human freedom.
However, I was less convinced by Keathley’s historical analysis. In numerous places I felt like he made sweeping generalizations that lacked support. In fact, at several points I wrote ‘needs references’ in the margin out of frustration. A good example of this can be seen in one of the later chapters. Keathley writes, “…Wesleyan-Arminians argue for a governmental view of the atonement, which understands the atonement as a general amnesty.” (194). I’m pretty certain that Wesleyan theology doesn’t demand adherence to a purely governmental theory of the atonement. As far as I can see, Wesley and Arminius both believed that substitution was an essential constituent element in atonement theology.
I was also disappointed by Keathley’s overly polemical tone. After struggling with the small treatments of Molinism as it relates to soteriology in Craig, Flint, and Stanglin and McCall’s Jacob Arminius, I had hoped that Keathley would do some really in-depth constructive work here. Instead I found that the majority of the book was given over to an extensive critique of Calvinism. I’m well aware of the arguments against the Calvinist system and so I had hoped that most of Keathley’s time would be spent hammering out the specifics of his ‘Molinist approach’. The blurb led me to believe that Keathley wanted to try and move beyond the overly argumentative tone of previous debates. Instead I found that the majority of the book was devoted to a refutation of Calvinism. On the other hand, when Keathley did get round to discussing the contribution that Molinism could make, he did offer some insightful thoughts. This was particularly true of the later chapters.
In the earlier chapters, particularly as regards Radical Depravity and Overcoming grace, Keathley leans heavily on the ‘ambulatory model’ offered by Richard Cross, Eleanor Stump and others. Keathley sums up the ambulatory model in the following,
“Imagine waking up to find you are being transported by an ambulance to the emergency room. It is clearly evident that your condition requires serious medical help. If you do nothing, you will be delivered to the hospital. However, if for whatever reason you demand to be let out, the driver will comply. He may express regret and give warnings, but he will still let you go. You receive no credit for being taken to hospital, but you incur the blame for refusing the services of the ambulance.” (104).
This kind of illustration offers a way of explaining how we can be completely responsible for our own sin while maintaining that God is completely responsible for our salvation. This insight isn’t original to Keathley but he does bring together a number of these kind of ideas in one place, which is to be commended.
The same is also true of the later chapters. None of what Keathley is saying there seems entirely original. With regards to the chapter on Eternal Life he draws heavily on William Lane Craig’s article “Lest Anyone Should Fall’: A Middle Knowledge Perspective on Perseverance and Apostolic Warnings”. He does offer an alternative proposal of his own but only gives two pages to it.
Overall then, while I think that Keathley offers an adequate introduction to Molinism and illustrates the need to bring Molinism into dialogue with explicitly soteriological concerns, I don’t think that those familiar with Molinism will find much of use here. The introductory work of Craig and Flint is generally better presented, leaving Keathley’s chapters slightly redundant. Moreover, the overemphasis on Calvinism’s shortcomings generally disrupts the flow of Keathley’s argument rather than enhancing it. The strongest chapters are definitely the treatments of Radical Depravity and Overcoming Grace but I’m not sure they do enough to warrant spending £25 on the book. One might be better off consulting the work of Cross and Stump for an in-depth explanation of the ambulatory model, Craig on the perseverance of the saints, George on the ROSES acronym, MacGregor’s Luis de Molina for an historical account of Molinism, and Stanglin and McCall’s Jacob Arminius as that describes Arminius’ distinctive use of his thought. Not everyone will have the time or the money to consult each of these; in the meantime Salvation and Sovereignty will have to do.
Geometric Theology 